

## Security Force Assistance: An Institutional Recommendation for the Army

by

Colonel Curtis B. Hudson Jr.  
United States Army



United States Army War College  
Class of 2013

### DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT: A

Approved for Public Release  
Distribution is Unlimited

This manuscript is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
<p>The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. <b>PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.</b></p>					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) xx-03-2013		2. REPORT TYPE STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Security Force Assistance: An Institutional Recommendation for the Army				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Colonel Curtis B. Hudson Jr. United States Army				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Professor Michael A. Marra Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College 122 Forbes Avenue Carlisle, PA 17013				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution A: Approved for Public Release. Distribution is Unlimited.					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES Word Count: 6,901					
14. ABSTRACT As the U.S. Army ends over a decade of war, Security Force Assistance must become a permanent part of the Army institution. The U.S. Army must look at practical ways to adopt SFA into our core competencies. More importantly, SFGA must become a part of the U.S. Army through the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) construct. This action will ensure language, responsibility, and legislation support a common understanding of how the Army will support the National Military Strategy in the coming years. The U.S. Army must look at the DOTMLPF in order to ensure unity of purpose, effort and command to provide the most effective support to the Nation. Creating an integrated Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, Multinational team will husband resources, while improving the overall Security Force Assistance construct with which the Department of Defense seeks to build partner capacity.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Foreign Security Forces, Foreign Internal Defense, Counterinsurgency, Regionally Aligned Forces					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT  UU	18. NUMBER OF PAGES  36	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT UU	b. ABSTRACT UU	c. THIS PAGE UU			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code)



USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**Security Force Assistance: An Institutional Recommendation for the Army**

by

Colonel Curtis B. Hudson Jr.  
United States Army

Professor Michael A. Marra  
Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations  
Project Adviser

This manuscript is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College  
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013



## **Abstract**

Title: Security Force Assistance: An Institutional Recommendation for the Army

Report Date: March 2013

Page Count: 36

Word Count: 6,901

Key Terms: Foreign Security Forces, Foreign Internal Defense, Counterinsurgency, Regionally Aligned Forces

Classification: Unclassified

As the U.S. Army ends over a decade of war, Security Force Assistance must become a permanent part of the Army institution. The U.S. Army must look at practical ways to adopt SFA into our core competencies. More importantly, SFGA must become a part of the U.S. Army through the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) construct. This action will ensure language, responsibility, and legislation support a common understanding of how the Army will support the National Military Strategy in the coming years. The U.S. Army must look at the DOTMLPF in order to ensure unity of purpose, effort and command to provide the most effective support to the Nation. Creating an integrated Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, Multinational team will husband resources, while improving the overall Security Force Assistance construct with which the Department of Defense seeks to build partner capacity.





## **Security Force Assistance: An Institutional Recommendation for the Army**

We remain a nation at war in an era of persistent conflict, but we do not stand alone. Our nation has many multinational partners, equally committed to freedom, rule of law and stability. It is clear that we are stronger when we act with partners in today's operating environment. Therefore, security force assistance is no longer an "additional duty." It is now a core competency of our Army.<sup>1</sup>

—GEN Martin Dempsey

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review sums up today's military imperative cleanly, "Furthermore, this review brings fresh focus on the importance of preventing and deterring conflict by working with and through allies and partners, along with better integration with civilian agencies and organizations."<sup>2</sup> If the United States Army intends to comply with this military imperative, then the Army must embed Security Force Assistance into every facet of the institution. The Army executes this recommendation through the use of doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF). Simply put, Security Force Assistance (SFA) can no longer fall into disuse between major conflicts. Since its inception in the Revolutionary War, the United States Army has received and shared the benefits of SFA. It has provided those benefits, episodically, to our allies and partners. Why, then, with such a clear clarion call from the then Commanding General of the U.S. Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), does SFA fail to permeate our U.S. Army institution? Given General Dempsey's closing sentence above, why do we fail to embed SFA as a core competency in our Army institution? Why do we wait to exhume SFA when it is needed for an ongoing conflict? Perhaps a review of the definition of SFA, the historical and strategic contexts of American SFA activities will better frame why and how to embed SFA as an Army core competency. Given the proper context, set in the current

environment, we can recommend a practical set of steps to mesh SFA into the Army's core construct: DOTMLPF.

### Security Force Assistance Defined

SFA consists of a number of terms, applied by different elements of the U.S. Armed Forces, to meet their specific doctrinal requirement. These terms apply from the strategic to the tactical level, involving theater commands all the way down to individual activities. There is no coherent, comprehensive approach to SFA. From doctrine to training to funding, SFA is not wielded as a single weapon.<sup>3</sup>

Security Force Assistance is defined as those activities (organize, train, equip, rebuild/build and advise –OTERA) that support the development of Foreign Security Forces (FSF) capability and capacity.<sup>4</sup> The Army defines SFA as the unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host-nation or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority.<sup>5</sup> The definition expands further, stating SFA improves the capability and capacity of host-nation or regional security organization's security forces. This expanded term is a minor impediment in the SFA effort in the use of overlapping terms. To add additional terms the Special Operations community uses its own set of terms regarding support of FSF.

The target audience of SFA is Foreign Security Forces (FSF). FSF are described as forces including but not limited to military, paramilitary, police, and intelligence forces; border police, coast guard, and customs officials; and prison guards and correctional personnel that provide security for a host nation and its relevant population or support a regional security organization's mission.<sup>6</sup>

To be most effective, SFA requires unified action through a whole of government approach in conjunction with developmental efforts across the diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement (DIME-FIL) construct.<sup>7</sup>

In concert with Joint doctrine (JP 3-0) and Army doctrine (FM 3-0, Operations), SFA occurs across the range of military operations, all phases of military operations, and across the spectrum of conflict. SFA occurs in any of the operational themes: peacetime military engagements, limited intervention, peace operations, irregular warfare, or major combat operations and may occur during offense, defense, and stability operations. SFA applies to the development of military, police, border, paramilitary, and unique or specifically tailored security forces and applies to all levels in government ministries, departments, and institutional structures responsible for host nation and regional security efforts. The efforts with police occur within many caveats and Department of State oversight. These factors are more reasons for SFA helping civil police.

Despite having a history of executing SFA activities, the term Security Force Assistance was only recently coined in 2006. Specifically in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. military found itself doing something where it had no existing terms that described what they were doing or doctrine on how to do it.

Some would argue that Foreign Internal Defense (FID) doctrine is sufficient. FID by DOD definition is when the U.S. helps a host nation government prevent or defeat insurgency, lawlessness or subversion. When Special Forces do FID, they organize, train, advise and assist host nation forces while the General Purpose Forces (GPF)

primarily conduct counter-insurgency (COIN). However, U.S. activities in Iraq and Afghanistan were not FID until Iraqi and Afghan governments were established.

Therefore, while doctrine is full of terms that are similar to SFA, these terms have been defined over the years to meet limited political purposes and not to support the personnel or units that must carry out the activity. No taxonomy exists. All DOD terms were not defined by the same set of discriminators so they will not nest.

Security Cooperation (SC) includes all DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.<sup>8</sup> Our strategy emphasizes building the capacities of a broad spectrum of partners as the basis for long-term security. We must also seek to strengthen the resiliency of the international system to deal with conflict when it occurs.<sup>9</sup>

Foreign internal defense (FID) is the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization, to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their security. The focus of U.S. FID efforts is to support the host nation's (HN's) internal defense and development (IDAD), which can be described as the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and protect itself from the security threats described above of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization, to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their security. The focus of U.S. FID efforts is to support the host nation's (HN's) internal defense and development (IDAD), which can be described as the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and protect itself from the security threats described above.<sup>10</sup>

To further illustrate the point, confusion exists even when the U.S. trains a force, such as the Georgians, to defend themselves from both external and internal threats. Such training would doctrinally be Security Cooperation (SC) and Security Assistance (SA) but not FID. However, if those same Georgian forces received Joint Combined Exchange Training

(JCET) with Special Forces or a combined exercise with U.S. GPF, that training would still be SC but it would no longer be SA. If the training was part of the DOS Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) conducted by a contractor, DOD might not be involved at all and in that case it would not be SC but it would be SA. None of these familiar doctrinal terms cover all developmental situations which can easily lead to gaps in planning and confusion during execution.<sup>11</sup>


SFA was coined to fix this problem by including all the activities done to support FSF development yet avoiding a complete rewrite of existing doctrine. It did this by focusing on the developmental activity rather than tie the term to a single purpose like FID, a single funding source like Security Assistance (SA), or a single agency like Security Cooperation (SC). Since operations often have multiple purposes, multiple sources of funding, and are conducted by more than one agency or branch of service, it begs the question of having one term for the same activity.

SFA then becomes a task or a capability that can be: paid for by multiple sources, accomplished by multiple organizations, executed within part of any type operation, for whatever purpose the U.S. intends it. The developmental activities are the same. The environment may change; the funding restrictions may vary, but preparing for and executing the developmental tasks are essentially the same.

### Historical and Contemporary Examples

Providing assistance to our partners is not a new endeavor for our Army. The Army has conducted this task over the past century more frequently than the average reader may think. Lend Lease and WW II heralded the United States SFA efforts for the next century. Our Defense Department efforts to organize, train, equip, build/rebuild and advise (OTERA) our partners rose and fell like a sine wave over that next century, as we employed this capability as needed by the conflict or interest of the moment. See

Figure 1.



**Source:** Adapted from Scott G. Wuestner, *Building Partner Capacity/Security Force Assistance: A New Structural Paradigm*, Strategic Studies Institute, February 2009, <http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/>.

Figure 1: Timeline of U.S. Security Force Assistance

The U.S. government adopted a policy of containment after World War II. This policy remained in effect through the end of the Cold War. This policy focused on stopping the spread of communism through the use of special operating forces and conventional forces assisting partner nations to build their capability and capacity. This policy also equipped and financed many nations to build or increase their military capacity, as well. U.S. military forces assisted many nations ranging from Greece, Korea, the Philippines, Vietnam, El Salvador, Panama, Israel, West Germany and Japan in order to improve their security forces. This assistance varied in size from small Marine Corps, Army and Special Forces advisor teams to large scale and integrated transition, assistance, and advisor groups like the Korea Military Advisor Group (KMAG) and the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) to long term partner cooperation and training between forces, like the cooperation seen in Europe.<sup>12</sup>

During the 1990s, the U.S. military conducted SFA activities in Bosnia, Kosovo, Georgia, Columbia and the Philippines amongst other nations. The U.S. also conducted numerous small scale activities across the continent of Africa. More recently, U.S. national policy has reflected an

increased emphasis on SFA as the primary activity to achieve U.S. national security objectives. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the multiple commands and organizations conducted security force assistance to develop capability and capacity of Foreign Security Forces (FSF) to better meet their nation's security requirements. All services and contractors provided manpower and other resources to aid in this effort.<sup>13</sup>

### Security Force Assistance Today

The U.S. Army's mission, as outlined in Army Doctrinal Publication 1 (ADP 1), describes the U.S. Army's primary purpose to fight and win the Nation's wars through prompt and sustained land combat, as part of the joint force. The Army's Vision defines the three strategic roles of the Army: prevent, shape and win. Department of Defense Directive 5100.01 (DODD 5100.01) refines the Army's mission to include other tasks beyond simply fighting the Nation's enemies.<sup>14</sup> The U.S. Army Operating Concept (AOC), TRADOC PAM 525-3-1 further describes threats, the environment and the tasks our Army will face in the near future. The AOC outlines the Army's mission in line with the DODD 5100.01. The Army will not only defend national interests by conducting military engagements, but also through security cooperation.<sup>15</sup> Security Cooperation requires a broad range of tasks inside of stability operations. The Army does this by augmenting the supported nation with its own capability or by developing capability and capacity in Foreign Security Forces (FSF) in order to enable that FSF to secure its own people.<sup>16</sup> These developmental activities are called Security Force Assistance (SFA).<sup>17</sup>

One has to only look to the National Security Strategy to find SFA tasks required of our Armed forces. Using the current national, department and service documents available, we will look at the current SFA construct to highlight areas of improvement. The President states, "Our military will continue strengthening its capacity to partner with foreign counterparts, train and assist security forces and pursue military to military

ties with a broad range of governments.”<sup>18</sup> The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) then takes this strategy further. Two of the four DoD priorities outlined in the QDR emphasize SFA. Prevent and deter and rebalance the force both contain subtasks that require SFA.<sup>19</sup> These priorities focus on developing or enhancing our partners’ capability and capacity. Under build the security capacity of partner states task, the QDR lists the following key initiatives: ***strengthen and institutionalize general purpose forces for security force assistance***; enhance linguistic, regional and cultural ability; strengthen and expand capabilities for training partner aviation forces; strengthen capacities for ministerial-level training; and create mechanisms for the acquisition and transfer of critical capabilities to partner forces. The author added the italics to emphasize SFA as part of our defense priorities. The remaining initiatives can fall under the first initiative. Joint doctrine defines SFA as, “SFA is DOD’s contribution to a unified action effort to support and augment the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces (FSF) and their supporting institutions to facilitate the achievement of specific objectives shared by the U.S.G. The U.S. military engages in activities to enhance the capabilities and capacities of a partner nation (or regional security organization) by providing training, equipment, advice, and assistance to those FSF organized in national ministry of defense (or equivalent regional military or paramilitary forces), while other U.S.G departments and agencies focus on those forces assigned to other ministries (or their equivalents) such as interior, justice, or intelligence services”.<sup>20</sup> The SFA proponent is U.S Special Operations Command.

#### The Army’s Approach to Executing Security Force Assistance

The chart below depicts Security Force Assistance as currently fitted into existing doctrine across the Joint Force.<sup>21</sup>






Figure 2: SFA Current Construct

The Army is regionally engaged and globally responsive; an indispensable partner and provider of a full range of capabilities to Combatant Commanders in a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multi-national environment. Regional alignment synchronizes the Army's strategic framework of Prevent, Shape, and Win by addressing the Army's enhanced regional and global presence in Prevent; improving the global security environment by increasing partner capacity in Army's Shape role; and underpinning the Army Total Force capability, capacity, and readiness to Win. As part of the Joint Force and as America's Army, in all that it offers, the Army provides the versatility, responsiveness, and consistency to Prevent, Shape and Win.<sup>22</sup>

The Army intends to execute its SFA responsibilities through a concept called Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF). Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) is the Chief of Staff of the Army's vision for providing Combatant Commanders with versatile, responsive, and consistently available Army Forces. Regionally Aligned Forces will meet Combatant

Commanders' requirements for units and capabilities to support operational missions, bilateral and multilateral military exercises, and theater security cooperation activities.<sup>23</sup>

Second only to providing security as required, the major joint force role in stabilization efforts is to help reform the Host Nation (HN) security sector and build partner capacity to make it an enabler of long-term stability.<sup>24</sup> The security sector comprises both military and civilian individuals and institutions responsible for the safety and security of the HN and the population at the international, regional, national, and sub-national levels.<sup>25</sup>

#### Framing the Problem of Institutionalizing Security Force Assistance

Multiple problems exist inside the current SFA construct. No taxonomy exists. There are no common terms across the Department of Defense that provide unity of purpose and facilitate unity of effort. Different legislation governs the funding for Army execution of Security Force Assistance, to include discrete component funding. This funding methodology directly determines the forces available for use. The forces available influences the command relationships based on component funding. Therefore we restrict our Nation's options in using SFA as a form of national engagement. Multiple programs, such as National Guard Bureau (NGB) State Partnership for Peace, Partnership for Peace (PFP) within European Command (EUCOM) and Africa Command's (AFRICOM) Regionally Aligned Force (RAF) implementation reflect the wide variance in how SFA is viewed and therefore executed across the Armed Forces. Have we clearly defined the strategic endstates for each GCC in relation to national strategy endstates to assure unity of purpose throughout the depth of the organization? Can we craft a larger purpose other than consistent, persistent engagement? Does this type of engagement really by us an undefined "favor

today for an undefined need we might have tomorrow? Can we afford this level of activity in the future, given a fiscally constrained environment?

U.S. foreign policy and national military strategy affect all SFA activities. More importantly, SFA is critical to these policies as it is a primary tool for building partnership capacity with other nations. Key strategy documents for SFA include the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, the National Military Strategy, the Quadrennial Defense Review, and DODD 3000.05.41/Homeland Security Presidential Directive-13 (HSPD-13) recognizing the U.S. must expand its scope beyond traditional military activities building professional and systemic relationships. HSPD-13 specifically relates to working closely with other governments and international and regional organizations to enhance the maritime security capabilities of other key nations by: (a) Offering assistance, training, and consultation with maritime and port security. (b) Coordinating and prioritizing assistance and liaison within maritime security regions. (c) Allocating economic assistance to developing nations for maritime security to enhance security and prosperity.<sup>26</sup>

The following definitions come from multiple sources that clearly illustrate the lack of a common vocabulary to clearly convey, intent and purpose across a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational (JIIM) integrated team.

Security Force Assistance is defined as the unified action to generate, employ, and sustain Afghan security forces to support the government and people of Afghanistan. Therefore, Security Force Assistance is the way in which ISAF will support the Afghan military and police to deliver security. Advisory and assistance teams represent one of the mechanisms (the means) by which Security Force Assistance is

delivered; however, this does not mean the cessation of all combat operations by coalition forces, who will still be required to fight alongside their Afghan counterparts until the threat is diminished. Security Force Assistance is the logical progression in the execution of ISAF's campaign to enable Afghans to take the lead for their own security. A secure environment is required to set the conditions for long-term economic development, effective rule of law, and the other functions of legitimate government.<sup>27</sup>

The different legislation governing SFA also causes friction in the taxonomy. Multiple U.S. Title Codes impact the forces available to the U.S. Army to meet SFA requirements. U.S. Titles 10 (Active Army), Title 32 (Reserve Component), Title 22 (Foreign Military Training) and legislation governing Foreign Military Sales (FMS) complicate unity of effort and command relationships. Add in the other Services, interagency and intergovernmental partners and the problem becomes clear. How does one build a coherent effort in SFA when the varying team members fund the activity differently? At a minimum, a new U.S. Title Code can provide funds directly to building partner capacity by region to enable Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) to fund JIIM teams to achieve their endstates. Also organizational changes, such as joint command structures that include State Department representatives, may open additional funding avenues. The same concept applies to intergovernmental agencies, as well.

Advising FSF is part of a larger program of U.S. assistance to other nations. The assistance may be bilateral between the U.S. and a foreign nation, part of an internationally sponsored effort, or the U.S. may use multiple methods to assist other nations in maintaining or achieving stability. The keys to success at the strategic,

operational, and tactical levels require advisors to coordinate with related efforts in a given operational area to include working with U.S. civilian interagency partners, multinational allies, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).<sup>28</sup> The Army must rethink how it addresses U.S. Army Component Commands, like U.S. Army Africa (U.S.ARAF). By adopting an organization similar to AFRICOM, U.S.ARAF can better integrate JIIM team members. Specifically, U.S.ARAF can add a deputy Ambassador directly into the command structure to improve interagency planning, coordination and cooperation. With this addition, the Army will improve its participation in the JIIM immediately. Each U.S. Army component command, to include Northern Command (NORTHCOM), can also establish liaison cells that consist of multinational elements similar to Canadian and Mexican military representation in the NORTHCOM staff. The logical conclusion of this integration will occur at the Brigade level in RAF units. The JIIM representation will reflect the Contemporary Operating Environment (COE) for the RAF.

Advising FSF is required across the spectrum of conflict. Advising may be required under a range of conditions from peace and relative security to insurgency and/or major combat operations with any combinations in between. The U.S. has provided advisors to different types of FSF for many years, particularly as part of antinarcotics and antiterrorism efforts. While recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have placed U.S. advisors into a counterinsurgency (COIN) combat environment, they should not be seen as the only conditions for employing advisors.<sup>29</sup> In order to realize success in our mission we must: PREPARE, in cooperation with our partners and allies, to respond to future crises and contingencies; PREVENT future conflicts by continuing

to strengthen our partners' defense capabilities; and PREVAIL in current and future operations.<sup>30</sup>

Partnering to Strengthen Defense Capabilities U.S. Africa Command assists African partners to develop the capabilities required to combat Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs), piracy, illicit trafficking, and prevent conflict. Increasing the ability of Africans to prevent, mitigate, and resolve conflicts leads to increases in stability and can create the conditions conducive to development. Building partner capacity is also important because it promotes the sharing of costs and responsibility for security on the African continent.<sup>31</sup>

The Army's RAF concept also continues to perpetuate an ad hoc approach to manning, training, equipping and financing. We will attempt to sequence efforts against deploying units, while trying to avoid have and have-nots in a resource constrained environment. We create short term groups of interested or affected individuals and organizations to prepare units for deployment. We rely on a host of these entities to come together to prepare a RAF for deployment. Also individuals may operate in the region, advising at the ministerial levels, who train at the Combat Readiness Center at Fort Benning for eight days. These individuals may have no knowledge or connection to the RAF or its mission. If the RAF for AFRICOM is an example of the approach to SFA, then the efforts may produce short term or tactical results, but will not produce a long term effect that sets conditions for a defined endstate. By adopting a JIIM integrated approach in the command relationships, we can flatten the hierarchy of multiple agencies with pieces of SFA. Each Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) is the supported unit in Theater Security Cooperation (TSC). However, the supporting

command provides the funding in most cases for the actual deployment based on the specific activity.

### Recommendations

How does the Army, given the preponderance of guidance and the incongruity of the mandates and doctrine, institutionalize SFA as a core competency? We will use the joint concept, which links strategic guidance to the development and employment of future joint force capabilities, to frame our recommendation. The joint concept also serves as “engines for transformation” that may ultimately lead to doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) and policy changes.

### Doctrine

The Army can emphasize the current definition of SFA. However, it must codify this activity as applicable to all levels of war in all environments. Currently, SFA is seen as a stability operation. The definition highlights the activities, but ignores the conditions. The doctrine will drive the organization, training, material and leadership involved. SFA will occur in permissive, semi-permissive and non-permissive environments. We may be invited into a country to perform limited SFA tasks, similar to AFRICOM, or we conduct offensive, defensive and stability operations concurrently across a region in either a general war setting or a counterinsurgency. The doctrine must reflect this reality through illustrations of integrated JIIM teams with clear lines of authority defined in common terms. The JIIM team could consist of the country team from the Department of State, the RAF from the U.S. Army, other joint services operating in the country, any U.S. governmental organizations, like U.S.AID, multinational partners, who are also participating in SFA, and any relevant non-

governmental organizations, as well. The members of this team must be identified as early in the planning process for employment of RAF in order to align authorities, funding and cooperation and coordination strictures. This early effort will allow for the country team to begin coordination and relationship building with all involved partners. It will also prepare the foundation for employment of the RAF in a cooperative fashion that will element redundant efforts, synchronize actions and resources and prevent friction between these differing organizations, as they all seek to improve security in a given country. A Department of Defense Instruction can help define the taxonomy. It can also synchronize and harmonize efforts between the Joint Force to our interagency and multinational partners. The instruction can propose or implement within DOD authority the coordination, cooperative and resource policies to facilitate a JIIM team for SFA. The doctrine must also define the SFA construct. As we have seen with all of the definitions across the Joint Force, many activities have similar purposes. In order to better define SFA delineate definitions by source, echelon and executor. For example, SFA as a subset of FID is executed in a semi-permissive or non-permissive environment. A RAF brigade could provide small tailored teams to work in concert with Special Operating Forces in an area, seeking to generate a specific capability or capacity, as a situation may dictate. The SOF could lead the capability effort while the RAF element leads the capacity effort. The doctrine would define supported and supporting efforts or more formal command relations, as required. The RAF element may require more security elements, which would come from its parent Brigade as part of the overall requirement. Interagency support in the form of government advisors, agricultural expertise or rule of law support and multiple forms of transportation inside



the contested environment could look like a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) or a tailor made element, like an Agricultural Development Team (ADT). The doctrine must also account for the other organizations and agencies operating in a particular country or region, to include multinational partners from military to government and non-government organizations. The doctrine must provide orientation to those entities in order to provide a broader understanding of the environment. This information will promote unity of effort, cooperation and coordination. It will also lead to a broader range of resources inside the joint, interagency environment, when purposes align. The doctrine should include the generic model of the country team construct that illustrates the relationship between the Department of State and Department of Defense to help the unit understand the mission command relationships and authorities inside the interagency community. This relationship must be understood, and if need be, defined to ensure unity of effort and unity of purpose, similar to the 3-D planning methodology and the integrated country strategy efforts being promulgated by the Department of State now. These relationships are particularly critical if unity of command is not possible for whatever reason(s). The TSC construct can provide more effectiveness when the country team and the SFA element understand their relationship and the overall strategic endstate. Why is the U.S. engaged in this region or country? Engagement for engagement's sake is not necessarily a strategic purpose in a fiscally constrained environment. The doctrine must help frame the discussion of national strategy in order to ensure the desired endstate is measurable and justifies the engagement in an area. Each Geographic Combatant Command, as well as the U.S. Army, should have distinct objectives for security force assistance efforts for multiple

reasons. The following benefits are obvious: planning, resource and training priorities for the RAF or other employed forces, specific guidance for coordination, cooperation and funding, shaping and sustaining efforts related to capacity and capability. This particular definition would help align foreign military sales to specific SFA end states. The entire doctrinal effort must seek to set context, define terms, relationships, authorities and provide as clear and concise additional information.

### Organization

As the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) will remain the primary unit supporting the RAF concept, the Army must look at the other organizations operating in the Area of Responsibility (AOR). With an overall amalgam of Theater Security Cooperation efforts applying “engagement,” the Army must provide purpose or at a minimum, coordination in order to ensure unity of effort, especially alignment of purpose and synchronization of effort. Once the Army commits a unit to a GCC, the unit will task organize based on its mission, critical tasks and endstate. Therefore the overall strategic endstate must help prioritize the BCT’s effort across that GCC. Currently, the RAF that will deploy to AFRICOM has 34 countries, 140 tasks and four languages to contend with for this deployment. The next higher headquarters must prepare to provide additional manpower to fulfill manning requirements above what the RAF can provide. That same headquarters must provide direction in planning, preparation and coordination, as the Senior Mission Commander for that RAF brigade prior to deployment. The benefits are twofold: the RAF can form, equip and train specific teams at home station and the individuals involved can receive broadening experience, as well as building expertise in a region for operations above brigade level, if needed. At this point the RAF will organize against individual tasks that will see elements of the BCT deploy, potentially

more than once. At no time will the entire BCT deploy at the same time and some elements of the BCT will not deploy. Given that organization, the BCT will have a difficult time organizing for the mission on its own in order to ensure unity of command and unity of effort. SFA will also continue to receive individual sourcing in Iraq and presumably Afghanistan post 2014. This ad hoc approach will further perpetuate a “fighting a ten year war one year at a time” approach to long term SFA engagements. The continuity provided by a country team in permissive or semi-permissive environments can help as described in doctrine, an Office for Security Cooperation (OSC) can help in semi-permissive environments where no country team exists or the Land Component Command for a theater can perform the same function in a non-permissive environment. The focus must remain on defining, establishing and employing a JIIM team that executes SFA. The forces available will define the capacity and capability of forces executing SFA. Care should be given to avoid forming specialized elements working for different chains of command, as seen in Iraq in 2006-2009 where there was an operational command, Multinational Corps-Iraq and an “institutional” command, Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq. Forming two commands presents multiple problems including increased command and control requirements, multiple units operating in one FSF area of operations, competition for resources and increased coordination and cooperation. Manning, training and equipping really becomes problematic in a non-permissive environment, especially security elements for small SFA elements. It also increases friction for the other members of the JIIM team, as multiple military elements will seek unity of effort along multiple lines of effort.

## Training

Training must focus on the unique aspects of SFA that can translate into core competencies. The skills and attributes that facilitate SFA can also improve core competencies due to skill application that spans many environments. Negotiation skills are a good example. Negotiation clearly occurs in multiple phases in the joint campaign model. Individual, collective and unit training must focus on SFA activities. The tasks must apply at echelon to ensure continuity of knowledge and standards. Institutional training may require an orientation in foreign military sales (FMS), country teams and interagency organizations and operations. United States Agency for international Development (U.S.AID) is a prime example of an interagency organization that would require institutional training, at least at the field grade and senior non-commissioned officer (NCO) level. The state of Indiana is attempting an effort similar to this recommendation now. Combat Training Centers (CTCs) have incorporated SFA inside of their rotations over the past 8-10 years. Post Iraq and Afghanistan rotations will continue to incorporate partner activities. Army exercises must look at gathering the entire team, whether replicated by contractors, facilitated by remote participation (VTCs, etc) and unit sourcing synchronization, especially for additional field grade officers or senior NCOs. The construct should also include the TRADOC Cultural Center, Leader Education for Stability and Peacekeeping (LDESP) along with country team briefings, country visits and language training. While all units have used a similar training continuum during preparation for Iraq and Afghanistan, the model had to be created, coordinated and executed like a new event for each BCT. While attempting to tailor the training for each BCT, this approach led to a wide spectrum of execution with results varying for each unit. Fighting a war with “the Army you have” is realistic, but as we

move in to a period of long term engagement in permissive environments, a standard training continuum can maximize resources, while allowing for unit specific tailoring for manning, equipping and training. The Army can also standardize the tasks that build a foundation for leadership and specific SFA tasks. Negotiation is a good example of a leader task that would also set the foundation for SFA tasks for leaders of all ranks. Recent efforts have created a RAF Community of Interest (RAFCOI) that designates the supported GCC as the lead for each region in this community. It attempts to bring all the required organizations together along with the required resources to prepare RAF units for their deployments. This approach may lead to a diffusion of resources and efforts through this cooperative approach. The various and numerous sources of funding under U.S. Title Codes will require significant focus to draw on the appropriate and necessary resources in support of their SFA training. A concerted effort will come from an integrated JIIM approach that lines up the required agencies through legislation for funding and DOD policies that drive Service policies to align priorities with resources with the appropriate organizations to execute. This approach will also allow division and installation headquarters to prioritize their efforts and support deploying RAFs to compensate for shortfalls in training resources.

### Material

The Army has the necessary equipment for SFA. The individual Soldier gear, communications gear and vehicles are sufficient to move our Soldiers in all environmental conditions. However, given the larger regional orientation of our SFA mission across all the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs), we must invest in two way translators to accompany our Soldiers. While some may assume interpreters or translators will be available in every area we serve that may not always be the case.

The importance of communication cannot be understated. Also home station resources must include language and cultural awareness tools. Most installations have education centers with Rosetta Stone and most Divisions have language instructors for CENTCOM operations. With a larger regional focus the Army will need to orient these types of resources to each BCT, which can be facilitated through Division G3 training coordination. This approach will allow for a synchronization and coordination effort that will provide both the training provider and the supported unit a clear vision of resources and requirements.

### Leadership

We must agree on the leadership attributes we consider for SFA. If relationships are the most critical aspect of engagement, then what leader attributes matter most? Which will require the most refined definitions to ensure quality training and high standards of performance? The most recent history of SFA in the CENTCOM AOR and the training of RAF for AFRICOM places value on negotiation, cultural awareness and interpersonal skills. Technical competence, tactical competence and experience have had lower values. Personality type testing can help identify individuals who may have a disposition for SFA activities or not. Better yet, virtual, constructive and live training can provide firsthand experience and define those leaders who can participate in a partnership and those who can support that partnership indirectly.

### Personnel

The single most important factor in personnel is assembling the team early enough in the training cycle to allow for team building outside the theater of operation. This effort will require organizations outside the Army, potentially, to engage in training earlier than seems feasible. However, if SFA is the priority, then organizations must

meet specified gates. Too often teams in Iraq or Afghanistan were formed in contact due to individual sourcing solutions and unsynchronized rotational timelines. The advantages of the team that will execute the mission formed first in training will produce longer lasting results that will stem from continuity, familiarity and unit of purpose. Too often the individual executing advising focused solely on his HN counterpart, excluding or ignoring larger efforts around him. Forming the team and then training the team followed by deploying the team will also provide better communication and team awareness. The understanding of who must know for what reasons can effectively prevent redundant or contrary efforts from occurring. Information fratricide prevention, expectation management and awareness of all available resources can lead to more effective efforts in SFA activities. This approach will also facilitate a one team, one voice approach that can only be achieved by proper manning at the proper time. This point leads to the second critical point pertaining to personnel. Unit sourcing from within the RAF must drive follow-on sourcing. The Worldwide individual Augmentation System (WIAS) provides sourcing outside an organization's ability to source, but can lead to late sourcing and impact team building. The diverse sourcing issue results from each brigade being sourced during the reset and trained/ready phases of the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model. Essentially personnel arrive when they are available to report a brigade regardless of its deployment timeline. The RAF's parent Division should be the first choice for taskings beyond the BCTs ability to source. The reasons are obvious. The team can form very close to receipt of mission facilitating all of the previously discussed advantages of this technique. On larger installation, the Corps and other resident units can source. Any individuals from outside the affected

installation that will source a WIAS tasker must be a part of the RAF's planning and coordination. The integrated team approach will ensure that all individuals, units, agencies and organizations communicate, coordinate and cooperate to achieve defined endstates.

### Facilities

This area will require little true change in regards to training resources and specialized facilities. Installation education centers with CAC card access can provide individual language training resources, access to cultural information and country specific information for research and study. The Army's current ranges, training areas and simulations and simulators are sufficient for now, but only if maintained. Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) sites along with driver's training courses and all associated infrastructure must be captured in this maintenance and support cost.

### Summary and Conclusion

In order to avoid a repeat of recent history and an ad hoc approach to our Nation's top engagement technique that involves the Army, we must synchronize across the DOTMLPF. The Army must make changes in order to inculcate SFA in all aspects of the Army institution. This method will ensure a unity of purpose supported by a common language that avoids an ill-defined, ad hoc environment. A coherent strategy with a JIIM integrated team will also help to mold legislation with a broader access to resources. Logical command relationships will maximize all available resources that facilitate effectiveness while maximizing efficiency. This approach will also build on our Nation's SFA lessons learned to promote long lasting effects. The utilization of an integrated JIIM team will ensure more resources than individual organization and agency efforts to achieve stove piped endstates that may support National interests, but



not in a congruent fashion to ensure a consistent engagement effort and message. This effort will promote unity of effort and provide a confident message to our partners based on a one team, one voice approach. This approach will synchronize resources through legislation, policy and instructional changes to bring the JIIM team together early in training. The manning and equipping will leverage Division, Corps and Installation assets to facilitate local resources to promote team building, maximize all resources through multiple echelons and reinforce priorities by pooling resources across the team. This effort will leverage country teams, interagency partners and multinational partners to become stakeholders while promoting cooperation and assistance. This approach will also convey clear intent and effort through a concise, well defined language that spans multiple departments, agencies and multinational organizations as required. The choice is clear. We can continue to approach SFA in an ad hoc fashion by cobbling resources together, relying on local commanders to “do the right thing” or we can provide purpose, direction, and resources to allow commanders and leaders the time and latitude in a SFA construct. This construct will enable initiative through a clearly defined continuum that has a common language, priority set and common message at all levels through unity of effort. One team, one voice will demonstrate a long term commitment around the world.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Field Manual (FM) 3-07.1 Security Force Assistance, Headquarters, Department of The Army, Washington DC, 1 MAY 2009 pg xiii.

<sup>2</sup> Quadrennial Defense Review, Office of the Secretary of Defense, The Pentagon, Washington DC, 1 February 2010, pg 1.

<sup>3</sup> Field Manual (FM) 3-07, Security Force Assistance, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 1 May 2009, pg. 1-3.

<sup>4</sup> Joint Publication (JP) 3-07, Stability Operations, Joint Headquarters, Washington, DC, 29 September 2011, pg. C-8.

<sup>5</sup> FM 3-07, Security Force Assistance, pg. 1-1.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid, pg. 1-1.

<sup>7</sup> Security Force Assistance Introductory Guide, United States Special Operations Command, 28 July 2011, pg. 6.

<sup>8</sup> Security Force Assistance Introductory Guide, United States Special Operations Command, 28 July 2011, pg. 7.

<sup>9</sup> National Defense Strategy 2008, Department of Defense, Washington DC, June 2008, pg. 9.

<sup>10</sup> Security Force Assistance Introductory Guide, pg. 7.

<sup>11</sup> Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance. "What is SFA", <https://jcsfa.jcs.mil/Public/WhatIsSFA.aspx>, accessed 13 February 2013.

<sup>12</sup> Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance. SFA Historical Context, <https://jcsfa.jcs.mil/Public/jointtext.aspx>, accessed 13 February 2013.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Army Doctrinal Publication 1, The Army, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington DC, 17 September, 2012, pg 1-8.

<sup>15</sup> The Army Operating Concept, Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-3-1, Headquarters, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, VA, 19 August 2010, pg 8.

<sup>16</sup> FM 3-07 pg.1-1.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid, pg.v.

<sup>18</sup> National Security Strategy, Office of the President of the United States, Washington, DC, 1 MAY 2010, pg 11.

<sup>19</sup> Quadrennial Defense Review, pg v.

<sup>20</sup> Joint operations, Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Headquarters, Washington, DC, 11 August 2011 pg. V-15.

<sup>21</sup> Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance. "What is SFA", <https://jcsfa.jcs.mil/Public/WhatIsSFA.aspx>, accessed 13 February 2013.

<sup>22</sup> Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 1, The Army, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, September 2012, pg. 1-5.

<sup>23</sup> Army Strategic Planning Guidance, pg. 8.

<sup>24</sup> Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance. "What is SFA", <https://jicisfa.jcs.mil/Public/WhatIsSFA.aspx>, accessed 13 February 2013.

<sup>25</sup> Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance. "What is SFA", <https://jicisfa.jcs.mil/Public/WhatIsSFA.aspx>, accessed 13 February 2013.

<sup>26</sup> Homeland Security Presidential Directive 13, Domestic Outreach Plan for the National Strategy for Maritime Security, Office of the President of the United States, Washington, DC, October 2005, pg. ii.

<sup>27</sup> ISAF Commander's Security Force Assistance Concept, Headquarters, International Security Assistance Force, Kabul, AF, October 2011, pg. 3.

<sup>28</sup> Commander's Handbook for Security Force Assistance, Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 14 July 2008, pg. 1.

<sup>29</sup> Field Manual 3-07.10, Advising, Multi-service tactics, techniques and procedures for Advising Foreign Security Forces, Headquarters, Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, VA, September 2009, pg. 3.

<sup>30</sup> Senate Armed Services Committee, Statement of General Carter Ham, U.S. Commander Africa Command, 1 March 2012, pg. 9.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid, pg. 15.

